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Blind Eagle uses judicial phishing in Colombia

Blind Eagle used judicial lures and HTML smuggling to deliver a RAT across Latin America, with Colombia as the main lure observed.

Whalemate Labs · AI-assisted researchPublished:38 min read

Blind Eagle, also tracked as APT-C-36, was observed in a regional campaign against organizations in Latin America that combined spear-phishing emails, judicial and administrative lures in Spanish and Portuguese, and an HTML smuggling delivery chain. The clearest documented lure was a judicial-themed XHTML file tied to Colombia that embedded a crafted SVG impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación. From there, the operation built an encrypted ZIP locally in the browser using ZipCrypto, launched a JavaScript dropper posing as Network Configuration Auditor version 2.7.298, ran a VBScript stage with AMSI and ETW evasion attempts, cleaned up origin and persistence artifacts, and ended with a PowerShell loader that decoded and executed in memory a RAT ZenoX assessed as an AsyncRAT fork with DCRat lineage.

Executive summary

Blind Eagle, also known as APT-C-36, was observed in a phishing campaign aimed at Latin American organizations that used judicial and administrative lures in Spanish and Portuguese to deliver a RAT. The clearest documented case was a judicial-themed XHTML file tied to Colombia, which hid a crafted SVG impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación and kicked off a multi-layer delivery chain, from HTML smuggling to in-memory execution through PowerShell.

According to ZenoX, as cited by The Hacker News, the operation started with spear-phishing emails sent to people who handle cases, contracts, judicial matters, or institutional service requests. The victim was pushed to open an attachment that was not a simple document, but an HTML and SVG container designed to display a fake page, build a ZIP file locally, and keep the full payload out of sight from email controls. That ZIP contained a JavaScript dropper that posed as Network Configuration Auditor version 2.7.298, profiled the environment, and then handed off to a Visual Basic Script stage with AMSI and ETW evasion attempts, persistence in Startup, and a PowerShell loader for the RAT.

The observed scope was regional, not limited to Colombia. The reports reviewed describe targets across judicial, prosecutorial, administrative, and educational organizations in Latin America. ZenoX reported nearly 3,300 malicious emails seen between late October and early November 2026, although it said not all of them were aimed at Colombian organizations. The key point for this report is that the sources document a campaign and a malware chain, but not a confirmed intrusion into any specific entity. The Colombian Fiscalía appears as the impersonated institution in the lure, not as a verified victim.

Attribution remains uncertain as well. ZenoX assessed the final RAT as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage, based on code, configuration, build traits, and observed behavior. It also said the mix of Portuguese and Spanish lures, Brazilian infrastructure, the operating time zone, and regional victimology were consistent with a Brazilian operating cluster tied to APT-C-36. That reading remains an inference from the researcher, not an independently verified identification of the operator. In parallel, another technical analysis suggested hunting indicators for "Boss/Client77" and "Client77" chains, plus artifacts tied to JavaScript disguised as Network Configuration Auditor and unexpected files in the Windows Startup folder. None of those elements, on their own, confirm successful intrusions.

Background and context

Blind Eagle appears in the material as a group active since 2018, also identified as APT-C-36. SC Media repeats that equivalence, but the November 2026 coverage does not provide independent verification of authorship for this specific campaign. What is firmly supported is the existence of a regional phishing operation built around judicial and administrative lures, designed to attract victims who handle sensitive documents or institutional workflows.

The lure theme was not random. The messages were written in Portuguese and Spanish, and they imitated judicial notices, prosecutor alerts, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents. The narrative was designed to resemble legitimate official communications, which is especially effective in settings where the recipient expects to receive summonses, filings, or case-related requests. The material does not say all emails were identical, but it does show a common line of social engineering built on authority, urgency, and formal paperwork.

The most closely analyzed file was a judicial-themed XHTML document tied to Colombia. Inside it was a crafted SVG that displayed a fake page impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación. Choosing Colombia did not, by itself, mean a Colombian victim was compromised. It did show that the lure used a recognizable regional institution as bait. Later sources kept stressing that point, because the agency appears as the impersonated entity, not as a confirmed victim of a successful breach.

The reporting also places the campaign within a narrow time window. ZenoX saw nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. The Hacker News clarified that not all were aimed at organizations in Colombia. Cyber NetSecOps added that this timing alone does not establish when any target was delivered, executed, or compromised. That distinction matters, because the date a wave is observed is not the same as the date of an intrusion.

Key facts table

Date Fact Source Confidence
2026-11-10 Blind Eagle, also known as APT-C-36, was observed in a phishing campaign against Latin American organizations using judicial and administrative lures. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The lures were written in Portuguese and Spanish, and they imitated judicial notices, prosecutor alerts, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The observed chain began with spear-phishing emails sent to people handling cases, contracts, judicial matters, or institutional service requests. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 A judicial-themed XHTML file tied to Colombia contained a crafted SVG impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The fake page used HTML smuggling to build a ZIP locally with ZipCrypto. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The ZIP contained a JavaScript dropper presented as Network Configuration Auditor version 2.7.298. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The JavaScript profiled the environment, including system version, network profile, install date, memory amount, computer name, environment variables, and Portuguese- and Spanish-language directories. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The next stage used VBScript to try to evade AMSI and ETW while showing a fake criminal summons page. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 The chain removed the original XHTML, cleared Mark of the Web metadata, and set persistence in the Windows Startup folder. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 PowerShell decoded and executed the final RAT in memory. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 ZenoX assessed the RAT as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 SC Media said no confirmed compromises had been documented in the campaign. SC Media confirmed
2026-11-10 ZenoX could not confirm whether any of the attacks succeeded against real targets. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 ZenoX observed nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. The Hacker News confirmed
2026-11-10 ZenoX linked the operation to a supposed Brazilian operating cluster based on infrastructure, time zone, languages, and regional victimology. The Hacker News attributed_by_source_as_uncertain
2026-11-10 ZenoX suggested the repeated focus on Colombia could be tied to structural weaknesses and uneven levels of security maturity. The Hacker News attributed_by_source_as_uncertain

Operation timeline

Date Event Actor/vector Verified source
Late October 2026 The wave of malicious emails observed by ZenoX begins. Spear phishing with judicial and administrative lures The Hacker News
Late October 2026 The messages push recipients to open attachments or files that mimic official paperwork. Phishing email The Hacker News
Late October 2026 A judicial-themed XHTML file loads an SVG that displays a fake prosecutor page. XHTML and SVG The Hacker News
Late October 2026 The fake page uses HTML smuggling and ZipCrypto to assemble a ZIP locally in the browser. Browser, HTML smuggling The Hacker News
Late October 2026 The ZIP drops a JavaScript file that pretends to be Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298. JavaScript dropper The Hacker News
Late October 2026 The JavaScript profiles the host and runs environment reconnaissance. System reconnaissance The Hacker News
Late October 2026 A VBScript stage launches with AMSI and ETW evasion and a fake criminal summons page as distraction. VBScript The Hacker News
Late October 2026 Traces of the original XHTML are deleted and Mark of the Web is cleared. Artifact cleanup The Hacker News
Late October 2026 Persistence is set in the Windows Startup folder. Local persistence The Hacker News
Late October 2026 PowerShell decodes and runs the RAT in memory. PowerShell The Hacker News
Early November 2026 ZenoX continues to observe nearly 3,300 malicious emails in the same campaign. Regional phishing wave The Hacker News
2026-11-10 The Hacker News publishes the main analysis of the campaign. Reporting The Hacker News
2026-11-10 SC Media summarizes the campaign and notes that no confirmed compromises have been documented. Secondary reporting SC Media
2026-11-11 Cyber NetSecOps publishes observables and defensive pivots. Technical analysis Cyber NetSecOps
2026-11-11 HuntPack publishes hunting markers and suggested searches. Threat hunting HuntPack

Attack chain and TTPs

The chain documented by the sources is consistent and relatively deep. This was not a single malicious attachment, but a sequence built from a document lure, malicious browser rendering, local extraction of the next stage, script execution, and final in-memory RAT loading. That chaining reduces direct exposure of the payload and moves much of the visible activity onto the victim host.

The starting point was the spear-phishing email. The messages were aimed at people who manage cases, contracts, judicial matters, or institutional service requests. The use of formal language and judicial or administrative themes fits a real work expectation. That context explains why the campaign included references to judicial notices, prosecutor alerts, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents. SC Media added that the targeted sectors were judicial, prosecutorial, administrative, and educational.

The most closely observed file was a judicial-themed XHTML document tied to Colombia. Inside it was a crafted SVG that displayed a fake page impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación. That piece was not just decorative. It served as both a presentation layer and the first step in the payload chain. From there, the fake page used HTML smuggling to assemble a ZIP locally in the browser with ZipCrypto. That detail matters, because it keeps the full file from traveling as a standard attachment and makes perimeter filtering harder.

The ZIP contained a JavaScript dropper presented as Network Configuration Auditor version 2.7.298. The sources say the script profiled the environment. The observed data included system version, network profile, installation date, memory amount, computer name, environment variables, and directories located in Portuguese and Spanish. That points to interest in system context, language, and machine traits before the chain continued.

After that stage, execution moved to a Visual Basic Script. According to The Hacker News, the VBScript tried to evade AMSI and ETW while also showing a fake criminal summons page to distract the victim. Cleaning the Mark of the Web metadata and removing the original XHTML completed the initial concealment phase. The chain then set persistence in the Windows Startup folder so the malicious component would relaunch at logon.

The final stage used PowerShell to decode and execute the RAT in memory. ZenoX assessed it as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage, based on code structure, configuration, build traits, and observed behavior. SC Media agrees on that broader family by describing the payload as a RAT related to AsyncRAT and DCRat. The material does not provide evidence of successful use of functions such as exfiltration, surveillance, or remote control over an identified victim, although some coverage mentioned those capabilities as potential.

Flujo de ataque Blind EagleCinco etapas documentadas por las fuentes consultadas.Spear phishingLure emailjudicial or administrativeXHTML and SVGFake pagefrom the prosecutor's officeHTML smugglingZIP createdin the browserJavaScript, VBScriptReconnaissanceand evasionIn-memory PowerShellDecodes and executes the RAT
Observed attack chain — From phishing to in-memory execution, with layers of distraction and evasion.
TTP Description Source
T1566.002 Spearphishing with judicial and administrative lures. The Hacker News, Cyber NetSecOps
T1027.006 HTML smuggling to build a ZIP locally in the browser. The Hacker News
T1059.007 JavaScript execution as an intermediate dropper. The Hacker News
T1059.005 Use of Visual Basic Script as an evasion and distraction stage. The Hacker News
T1547.001 Persistence through the Windows Startup folder. The Hacker News, Cyber NetSecOps
T1140 Decoding and execution of the final payload. Cyber NetSecOps
T1059.001 PowerShell used to load the RAT into memory. The Hacker News

Regional impact

The campaign had regional reach and was not limited to a single country. The sources reviewed describe a pattern of judicial and administrative lures aimed at Latin American organizations, with emphasis on judicial, prosecutorial, administrative, and educational sectors. The most concrete geographic detail comes from ZenoX, which saw a wave of nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. The Hacker News clarified that not all of them were aimed at organizations in Colombia.

Regional picture

The shared trait across the coverage is the mix of language, theme, and delivery vector. The lures were written in Portuguese and Spanish, which supports a regional reach rather than a single jurisdiction. The sources also describe Brazilian infrastructure and an operating time zone that, according to ZenoX, would be consistent with a Brazilian operating cluster. That interpretation remains ZenoX’s hypothesis, not a confirmed attribution.

Regional reference should not be confused with a list of confirmed victims. The available material does not identify compromised organizations or provide hashes, domains, or samples that would let analysts trace a specific intrusion by country. It also does not present evidence of exfiltration or successful remote access. The value of the reporting lies in reconstructing the chain, not in naming victims.

Mapa regional Blind EagleCobertura por país mencionada en el material consultado.Coverage and mentions by countryColombiaObserved lureChileAttributed historyEcuadorAttributed historyPanamaAttributed historyBrazilOperational hypothesis
Regional coverage map — Countries mentioned in the material, distinguishing observed activity and historical attribution.

Colombia

Colombia is the best-documented country in the available material, but only as the lure and impersonation target. The analyzed file contained a judicial-themed XHTML document and a crafted SVG that showed a fake page impersonating Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación. That proves Colombia was used as social-engineering bait, not that a Colombian entity was breached.

The sources also say the campaign targeted judicial, prosecutorial, administrative, and educational organizations, and that the Colombia reference is supported specifically by the fake Fiscalía impersonation seen in the lure. ZenoX, however, said it could not confirm whether any of the attacks succeeded against real targets. SC Media was more explicit, stating that no confirmed compromises had been documented.

Blind Eagle’s continued interest in Colombia also appears in ZenoX’s comment about possible structural weaknesses and uneven levels of security maturity in parts of critical, public, financial, and private infrastructure. That statement belongs in the realm of possible explanation, not proof. It helps frame the persistence of the focus, but it does not establish motivation or success.

Chile

The material does not document a Chilean intrusion in the November 2026 campaign. Mentions of Chile come from the group’s regional history, not from a concrete sample, email, or compromise. Yaamlabs said Kaspersky had recorded Blind Eagle activity against organizations or victims in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Panama, with Colombia receiving more weight in 2024 espionage campaigns. Alcybr also summarized that the group has historically targeted government and commercial entities in those countries.

That reference is useful for understanding regional tactical continuity, but it does not support attribution of the recent campaign to a specific Chilean organization. The available coverage does not tie any domain, hash, file, or Chilean victim to the operation under investigation. In evidentiary terms, Chile appears as part of the actor’s history, not as a confirmed setting for the November 2026 episode.

Countries without additional verified coverage

No additional verifiable facts were identified for Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Mexico, the United States, or Uruguay within the consolidated material for this investigation.

Technical indicators

The material does not publish hard IOCs such as hashes, IPs, domains, or unique file names for the final payload. It does, however, leave observables and hunting markers useful for internal search and triage.

Type Value Source
String Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 The Hacker News, HuntPack
String Boss/Client77 HuntPack
String Client77 HuntPack
Path C:\Users[user]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ Cyber NetSecOps
Process wscript.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Process cscript.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Process chrome.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Process msedge.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Process explorer.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Process powershell.exe Cyber NetSecOps
Event Windows 4688, process creation Cyber NetSecOps
Artifact blob: URL in browser history or proxy logs Cyber NetSecOps
Artifact PowerShell with -EncodedCommand Cyber NetSecOps
Artifact Unexpected .lnk or script files in Startup Cyber NetSecOps

Analysis for security teams

The operational priority is to detect the combination of HTML smuggling, intermediate scripting, and local persistence before the RAT reaches full execution. The material shows that the payload is not delivered as a visible ZIP through email, but assembled in the browser from an embedded Base64 chain. For that reason, inspecting attachments alone is not enough. Teams need to correlate browser activity, temporary file creation, and script execution on endpoints.

For detection, the first useful signals are soft but consistent. Cyber NetSecOps recommends reviewing blob: URLs in browser history or proxy logs, execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with downloaded JavaScript, PowerShell with -EncodedCommand, and unexpected files, especially .lnk or scripts, in the Windows Startup folder. Those elements are not exclusive to Blind Eagle, but they fit the observed technique. If they appear in sequence, the case should move up in priority.

It also helps to look at process chains. The analysis reviewed mentions wscript.exe or cscript.exe, chrome.exe or msedge.exe, explorer.exe, and powershell.exe as useful telemetry sources, along with Windows event 4688. In a case like this, the goal is not to find one perfect indicator, but to build a coherent execution story. A browser that creates local content, followed by scripting and then in-memory PowerShell, deserves immediate review.

For containment, the focus should be on cutting persistence and preserving evidence. The Windows Startup folder is a concrete place to check. If an unexplained .lnk or script appears there, the host should be isolated, user and memory artifacts collected, and the full execution sequence reviewed. The cleanup of Mark of the Web and removal of the original XHTML suggest the actor expected to erase part of its footprint, so residual artifacts may be limited if triage is delayed.

For preventive mitigation, organizations should tighten controls on scripting and PowerShell, along with email filters that do not rely only on the attachment itself. The chain described shows the ability to evade AMSI and ETW, so trusting a single control layer is not enough. The most effective approach is to combine browser, process, file, and Startup telemetry with hunting rules for the strings and paths already mentioned. For teams with EDR coverage, a case where wscript.exe leads to powershell.exe and leaves a .lnk in Startup should be treated as suspicious until proven otherwise.

Frequently asked questions

What part of Blind Eagle’s chain was hardest to stop with email controls?

The hardest part was HTML smuggling, because the next-stage ZIP was built locally in the browser and did not travel as a complete ZIP attachment. That reduces the effectiveness of classic perimeter controls. The evidence from The Hacker News and Cyber NetSecOps shows that email inspection alone is not enough.

Which countries had direct evidence and which were only historical references?

Colombia had direct evidence as the impersonated country in the lure, with an XHTML file and SVG that imitated the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Chile, by contrast, appears only in the group’s regional history cited by secondary sources, without a concrete sample, email, or compromise in the November 2026 campaign. The rest of the countries mentioned had no additional verifiable facts.

What signals should response teams correlate first?

The best correlation combines blob: URL activity, execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe with downloaded JavaScript, and then PowerShell with -EncodedCommand or in-memory execution. If an unexpected file or access appears in Windows Startup as well, the case should move up in priority. That combination summarizes what Cyber NetSecOps, The Hacker News, and the hunting pivots describe.

Does the campaign confirm a successful intrusion in Colombia?

No. The sources document the phishing campaign, the malware chain, and the impersonation of Colombia’s Fiscalía, but ZenoX said it could not confirm success against real targets and SC Media said no confirmed compromises had been documented. Colombia therefore appears as a lure reference, not a confirmed victim.

What is the RAT’s relationship to AsyncRAT and DCRat?

ZenoX assessed the final payload as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage, based on code structure, configuration, build traits, and observed behavior. SC Media similarly described it as a RAT related to AsyncRAT and DCRat. Neither source provided evidence of successful use against an identified victim.

Material limitations

The available corpus makes it possible to reconstruct the technical chain and the regional scope of the phishing, but not to identify a confirmed victim, a domain, a hash, or a specific IP address. There is also no published evidence of exfiltration, successful persistence in a named organization, or confirmed remote access to a real target.

The hypothesis of a Brazilian operating cluster remains ZenoX’s assessment, not an independent confirmation. The same applies to the explanation for the repeated focus on Colombia, which the source presents as a possible structural reading rather than a demonstrated motive.

Some secondary reports add historical context about countries and earlier Blind Eagle activity, but they do not turn those precedents into evidence of compromise for the November 2026 campaign. In particular, the mention of Chile describes the actor’s regional history, not a verified intrusion into a Chilean entity during this episode.

Graphics

Timeline de la operación Blind EagleCorreos de spear phishing, HTML smuggling, persistencia y carga del RAT en memoria.Late OctoberWave ofspearphishingtargetedStart of chainXHTML and SVGimpersonate theprosecutor'sofficeNext stageZIP in browserand dropperJavaScriptEvasionVBScript, AMSIETW andpersistenceEarly NovemberPowerShellloads theRAT inmemory
Operation timeline — Sequence observed between late October and early November 2026.
Matriz TTPs Blind EagleTécnicas observadas y su relación con la cadena de ataque.TTPDescriptionSourceT1566.002Spearphishing with legal luresCyber NetSecOpsT1027.006HTML smuggling and locally built ZIPThe Hacker NewsT1059.007JavaScript execution on the hostThe Hacker NewsT1547.001Windows Startup persistenceThe Hacker NewsT1140Decoding and executing the payloadCyber NetSecOps
TTPs and observables — Technical assignments supported by the sources reviewed.

Sources

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