Blind Eagle Phishing Targets Colombia With RAT
ZenoX reconstructed a phishing wave with judicial lures, SVG/XHTML chaining, JavaScript, VBS, and a RAT, with no confirmed victims.
ZenoX reconstructed a regional phishing campaign observed between October 21 and November 1, 2026, using judicial and administrative lures in Spanish and Portuguese, with a clear focus on Colombia. The analysis was based on 12 fraudulent emails detonated and examined in separate virtual machines over about seven days. The technical chain started with a large XHTML file that was actually a disguised SVG and displayed a fake query tied to Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. From there, the flow used HTML smuggling to generate a locally built ZIP protected with ZipCrypto, a JavaScript dropper posing as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298, a VBS stage with AMSI and ETW bypasses, and finally PowerShell to decrypt and load a x64 RAT into memory.
ZenoX's report, and coverage derived from The Hacker News, agree that there is no evidence of a real victim organization being compromised. The report itself says the visible corpus was small and does not allow the full scope or the sector or country distribution to be extrapolated. The Hacker News reported, citing ZenoX, that there were nearly 3,300 malicious emails during the period, but also noted that not all of them were aimed at Colombia and that successful operations against real targets could not be confirmed. AlCybr and HuntPack add important context: the first recalls Blind Eagle, or APT-C-36, has a regional history in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Panama, while the second warns that attribution and shared infrastructure should not be confused with independent confirmation of the wave under analysis.
On the technical side, the chain left artifacts and hunting patterns that are useful for defenders, including persistent files %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_
Executive summary
ZenoX reconstructed a regional phishing wave with judicial and administrative lures, observed between late October and early November 2026, from 12 fraudulent emails analyzed in a lab. The technical chain combined a disguised SVG/XHTML file, HTML smuggling, a ZipCrypto-protected ZIP, JavaScript, VBS, and PowerShell to end with a x64 RAT loaded into memory. The visible material points clearly to Colombia in the initial lure, while the rest of the campaign uses Spanish and Portuguese and touches justice, public administration, and education sectors, with no proof of confirmed real victims.
The most relevant initial artifact was a file named 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml, about 4.2 MB in size, which actually worked as an SVG built to render a fake consultation page from Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. That page did not download the archive directly. Instead, it generated a ZIP locally with ZipCrypto and displayed the password on screen. The observed name followed the pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip, a way to evade mail gateway inspection and move execution into the victim's browser or host.
Inside the ZIP was a JavaScript dropper presented as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298. That script collected system and environment information, including OS version, network profile, install date, memory, computer name, environment variables, and directories localized in Portuguese and Spanish. It then chained additional stages, including a VBS file that bypassed AMSI and ETW, showed a decoy page titled CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA, deleted the original XHTML, and manipulated Zone.Identifier to remove Mark of the Web. Persistence was reconstructed through an XHTML file under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, an auxiliary copy in C:\Users\Public\, and a Startup shortcut based on SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs.
The final stage was handled by PowerShell, which decoded the payload using AES-256-ECB, a custom Base85 scheme, and GZIP, then loaded it into memory through Reflection and delegates. ZenoX classified the binary as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage, while lab analysis describes it as a native x64 PE64, classified as a DLL, written in VB.NET on .NET Framework 4.8, with obfuscation, virtualization, and altered names. Observed behaviors include a hidden desktop with CreateDesktopW, keylogging, screen capture, streaming, token impersonation, and input blocking. In parallel, the report published observed infrastructure, with limits: crp2026[.]online behind Cloudflare, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com as the C2, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 with ports 4782, 5357, and 5985. There is no evidence in the material of successful compromise in real organizations, and the report itself warns that the corpus is small and does not allow total scope or victim distribution by country or sector to be measured precisely.
Context and background
The investigation relied on a limited set of 12 initial fraudulent emails, collected and detonated in separate virtual machines over about seven days. The visible dates help place the timeline, but they do not prove when the code was written or whether infrastructure had been compromised earlier. One of the consultation pages analyzed shows a generation date of October 21, 2026. Another shows October 27, 2026, while captured headers record messages from October 27 and 30. The capture names indicate collection on November 1, 2026.
Coverage derived from The Hacker News placed the wave at nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. That figure broadens the reference frame, but it does not change a central limitation in the case, no successful attack against real targets could be confirmed. AlCybr reinforced that point by noting that ZenoX analyzed 12 messages in controlled environments and did not report evidence of a real organization being compromised. HuntPack, for its part, stressed that this set should not be mixed with background sources on earlier Blind Eagle campaigns.
The lures were written in Spanish and Portuguese and simulated judicial notices, prosecutor alerts, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents. The visible corpus included recipients associated with justice, public administration, and education, as well as contacts tied to public organizations. The report makes clear that the set is small and does not allow proportions by sector to be extrapolated. The explicit judicial focus identified points to Colombia, through the impersonation of a Colombian judicial body and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, but the report does not provide a complete list of affected countries or a victim count by jurisdiction.
ZenoX also proposed a Brazilian operator hypothesis based on hosting in Cotia, Brazilian ASN 265919, the America/Sao_Paulo time zone, code references in Portuguese, and Portuguese lures. That reading is presented as a hypothesis, not as confirmation. The report itself acknowledges that language and regional context alone do not prove the operator's physical location. In the same vein, The Hacker News presents the attribution to Blind Eagle, also known as APT-C-36, as ZenoX's assessment, not as independent corroboration. AlCybr adds that the use of Portuguese lures does not by itself prove the actor expanded into Brazil, although it does widen the region's potential exposure.
Key facts table
| Date | Fact | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 | A consultation page linked to the chain showed a generation date of October 21, 2026. | ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-10-27 | Another consultation page showed a generation date of October 27, 2026, and captured headers recorded messages from October 27 and 30. | ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-01 | The captures analyzed by ZenoX were collected on this date. | ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-04 | ZenoX published the analysis of the campaign and its reconstruction from 12 fraudulent emails. | ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-04 | The file 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml was actually a disguised SVG impersonating Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. |
ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-04 | The chain created persistence through %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, a copy in C:\Users\Public\, and SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs in Startup. |
ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-04 | The final payload was classified as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage. | ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-04 | ZenoX published crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com as observed infrastructure. |
ZenoX | confirmed |
| 2026-11-10 | The Hacker News reported, citing ZenoX, nearly 3,300 malicious emails in the wave. | The Hacker News | attributed_by_source_as_uncertain |
| 2026-11-11 | HuntPack published MITRE ATT&CK mapping and hunting patterns for the chain. | HuntPack | confirmed |
Operation timeline
| Date | Event | Actor/vector | Verified source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 | The fake consultation page already showed a visible generation date in the lure. | SVG/XHTML consultation page | ZenoX |
| 2026-10-27 | Another page linked to the campaign showed a generation date, and email headers from October 27 and 30 were captured. | Email and web lure | ZenoX |
| 2026-11-01 | The captures analyzed by ZenoX were collected on this day. | Analysis lab | ZenoX |
| 2026-11-04 | ZenoX published its report on the phishing wave. | ZenoX | ZenoX |
| 2026-11-10 | Derivative coverage from The Hacker News included the nearly 3,300-email figure. | The Hacker News | The Hacker News |
| 2026-11-11 | HuntPack published hunting queries and associated TTPs. | Threat hunting repository | HuntPack |
Attack chain and TTPs
The observed chain is modular and depends on several evasion layers before it reaches the final RAT. The entry point was an email with a judicial or administrative lure, in Spanish or Portuguese, that delivered an XHTML file styled like a formal document. That file was not a simple document, but a disguised SVG designed to render a fake consultation page from Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. From there, the flow built a ZIP locally with ZipCrypto, shifting inspection to the victim's browser or system.
The next step was a JavaScript dropper that posed as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298. That script performed host and environment reconnaissance, querying system data, network profile, install date, memory, computer name, environment variables, and paths localized in Portuguese and Spanish. It then chained additional stages, including a VBS file that bypassed AMSI and ETW, displayed a fake criminal citation page, and cleaned traces from the original XHTML. It also manipulated Zone.Identifier to remove Mark of the Web.
Persistence was reconstructed from three elements: the hidden XHTML file at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, an auxiliary copy in C:\Users\Public\, and a shortcut in the Startup folder based on SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs. That combination suggests a simple but effective strategy to survive reboots and maintain the appearance of system-related activity. The final stage, executed by PowerShell, decoded the payload with AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, and GZIP, then loaded it into memory using Reflection and delegates.
ZenoX described the final binary as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage. Lab analysis placed it as a native x64 PE64, classified as a DLL, written in VB.NET on .NET Framework 4.8, with obfuscation and virtualization. The documented behavior includes a hidden desktop, keylogging, screen capture, streaming, token impersonation, and input blocking. The report also cites internal strings such as Boss/Client77, Client77, Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, and IdSender, which are useful for enrichment but are not exclusive to this variant.
| MITRE ATT&CK TTP | Description | Source |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment with judicial and administrative lures. | HuntPack |
| T1204.002 | User execution of a malicious file. | HuntPack |
| T1027.006 | HTML Smuggling to build the ZIP in the browser. | HuntPack |
| T1036 | Masquerading of XHTML, JavaScript, and VBS. | HuntPack |
| T1027 | Use of compressed files and obfuscation. | HuntPack |
| T1059.007 | JavaScript execution. | HuntPack |
| T1059.005 | Visual Basic Script execution. | HuntPack |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell use for decryption and in-memory loading. | HuntPack |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer for later stages. | HuntPack |
| T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. | HuntPack |
| T1070.004 | File deletion of the original XHTML. | HuntPack |
| T1553.005 | Mark-of-the-Web bypass through Zone.Identifier manipulation. | HuntPack |
| T1547.001 | Startup Folder for persistence. | HuntPack |
| T1562.001 | Impair Defenses, including AMSI and ETW bypass. | HuntPack |
| T1620 | Reflective Code Loading of the final payload. | HuntPack |
| T1056.001 | Keylogging. | HuntPack |
| T1113 | Screen Capture. | HuntPack |
| T1125 | Video Capture. | HuntPack |
| T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft. | HuntPack |
| T1005 | Data from Local System. | HuntPack |
| T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography. | HuntPack |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. | HuntPack |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery. | HuntPack |
| T1012 | Query Registry. | HuntPack |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery. | HuntPack |
Regional impact
The campaign shows a broad regional surface, but the material does not allow confirmed real victims to be claimed or impact to be distributed by country with precision. What is clear is the use of bilingual lures aimed at justice, prosecutors' offices, public administration, and education, with a visible focus on Colombia and a hypothesis of Brazilian operational context, always presented as an inference rather than a closed attribution. ZenoX spoke of nearly 3,300 emails in the wave, while the corpus actually analyzed was 12 messages.
Regional overview
The regional pattern combines institutional language, judicial topics, and administrative vectors to reach high-value profiles in Latin America. The mix of Spanish and Portuguese increases the chance of interaction across several countries, but the only country explicitly identified in the lures and documents is Colombia. The rest of the regional reading rests on visible victimology and associated infrastructure, not on confirmed compromises.
Colombia
Colombia is the only country explicitly identified in the main technical lure, because of the impersonation of a Colombian judicial body and the Fiscalía General de la Nación. The initial file 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml and the fake judicial query point to that jurisdiction, while another message simulates a tutela proceeding and an urgent circular linked to public procurement. Even so, ZenoX makes clear there is no evidence of a confirmed Colombian victim or a real compromise in an operational environment.
Brazil
Brazil appears in the operator attribution hypothesis because of hosting in Cotia, Brazilian ASN 265919, the America/Sao_Paulo time zone, and code references in Portuguese. The Hacker News presents that reading as ZenoX's assessment, not as independent confirmation. Brazilian coverage from Estadão/TecMundo repeats the nearly 3,300-email figure, but it also does not establish confirmed compromises in Brazilian organizations.
Argentina
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material to assign confirmed impact to Argentina. The campaign's regional language could widen potential exposure, but the research offers no victims, domains, or lures specifically attributed to that country.
Chile
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Chile. AlCybr recalls that Blind Eagle has a regional history in several Latin American countries, including Chile, but that background reference does not belong to this infection chain and should not be mixed with it.
Paraguay
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Paraguay. The analyzed corpus does not allow victims or country-specific lures to be identified for that jurisdiction.
Bolivia
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Bolivia. The available evidence is limited to the general chain and observed infrastructure, without country-level breakdown.
Peru
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Peru. The report does not include indicators or cases tied specifically to that country.
Mexico
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Mexico. The campaign could matter to agencies and companies across the region, but ZenoX does not break down confirmed destinations by country in the analyzed set.
United States
There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for the United States. Shared Cloudflare infrastructure should not be read as geographic origin, and the research offers no territory-specific link to that country.
Technical indicators
| Type | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | crp2026[.]online | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| IP | 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| IP | 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| C2 hostname | vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| IP associated with C2 | 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| Port | 4782 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| Port | 5357 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| Port | 5985 | ZenoX, HuntPack |
| File | 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml | ZenoX |
| File | Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 | ZenoX, The Hacker News |
| File | Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip | ZenoX |
| File | %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml | ZenoX |
| File | C:\Users\Public\ | ZenoX |
| File | SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs | ZenoX |
| File | client77_rat.bin | ZenoX |
The hash prefixes published by ZenoX, efa891[...], 43bf[...], and 3bfb[...], were truncated in the public version of the report. HuntPack notes that IPs 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 are shared Cloudflare addresses and should not be treated as the operator's origin. It also recommends using only crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142, along with the observed ports on the C2 node, as actionable indicators.
Analysis for security teams
The operational priority is to detect the full chain, not just a domain or IP. The initial vector is built so the email looks like a formal justice or public administration communication, with themes such as judicial process, tutela, prosecutor notices, or procurement. The most useful preventive control point is the combination of large HTML or XHTML attachments, file names in expediente format, and a ZIP that is generated locally and only resolved in the browser.
In email, the useful correlation combines language, format, and delivery. The name 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml, together with the pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip, offers a reasonable filter for hunting and triage. It is also worth reviewing messages with formal references to case files, judicial notices, or tutela proceedings, especially when the communication pushes the user toward immediate opening.
On the endpoint side, the sequence leaves more stable traces than the C2. The patterns SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml, and copies under C:\Users\Public\ provide better value for retrospective hunting than an IP behind Cloudflare. Also useful are signs of XHTML deletion, Zone.Identifier manipulation, VBS in Startup, and anomalous PowerShell execution with decoding before code reflection.
The execution-defense side deserves specific attention. AMSI and ETW bypasses, Reflection, delegates, and in-memory loading of a VB.NET binary on .NET Framework 4.8 indicate a chain designed to reduce visibility. In that context, behavior-based detection is more effective than hash-only detection. HuntPack's MITRE ATT&CK mapping can be used to refine queries in SIEM or EDR tools, especially for T1059.001, T1620, T1547.001, T1562.001, T1056.001, and T1134.001.
For prioritization, the combination of crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com is stronger than the parent domain myvnc[.]com or the Cloudflare IPs. HuntPack makes that clear, and the warning matters to avoid noise. If the C2 or the persistence artifact is found, the case should be treated as a probable compromise or a very advanced attempt, but the available material does not allow successful exploitation in the region to be asserted.
Frequently asked questions
What part of the chain is best supported, and what remains hypothetical?
The best-supported part is the technical chain observed in the lab, from the fake XHTML to in-memory RAT loading. The least solid hypothesis is the operator's geographic attribution to Brazil, because it rests on infrastructure, time zone, and language without independent confirmation. See also the sections "Attack chain and TTPs" and "Regional impact."
Are there confirmed victims in Colombia or Brazil?
No. ZenoX said it could not confirm successful attacks against real targets, and AlCybr notes the analysis was done on 12 emails in controlled virtual machines. Colombia appears in the main lure, but not as a confirmed victim. Brazil appears as a possible operational context, not a proven destination. See "Executive summary" and "Regional impact."
Which IOCs are worth using for hunting, and which are not?
The most actionable indicators are crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142, with ports 4782, 5357, and 5985 observed on the C2. HuntPack clarifies that myvnc[.]com alone is not a specific IOC, and that the Cloudflare IPs should not be treated as the operator's origin. See "Technical indicators."
What local artifacts should be searched for on endpoints?
HuntPack recommends checking SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml, copies in C:\Users\Public\, the presentation name Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298, and the ZIP pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip. If PowerShell execution with prior decoding also appears, the case rises in priority. See "Technical indicators" and "Analysis for security teams."
Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques best summarize this campaign?
The most representative techniques are spearphishing attachment, HTML smuggling, JavaScript, VBS, PowerShell, defense evasion, Startup Folder, reflective code loading, keylogging, screen capture, and token impersonation. HuntPack published a broad mapping that also includes file deletion, deobfuscation, data from local system, and exfiltration over C2 channel. See "Attack chain and TTPs."
Material limitations
The main limitation is the lack of independent confirmation of successful attacks. ZenoX worked with 12 emails and a controlled lab, while the nearly 3,300-message figure comes from derivative coverage and does not change that limitation. The material does not allow a real compromise to be asserted for an organization in Colombia, Brazil, or any other country.
Full hashes, YARA or Sigma rules, complete C2 configuration, full host or mutex values, and exact registry key paths were also not published. The hash prefixes appear truncated, and the infrastructure IOCs must be interpreted carefully because of Cloudflare and the myvnc host range. Attribution to Blind Eagle or APT-C-36, and the hypothesis of a Brazilian operational cluster, remain source assessments rather than independent verification.
Sources
- LAST HEIST: New APT-C-36 infection wave in LATAMzenox.ai· ZenoX
- Blind Eagle Uses Fake Court Notices to Deliver Remote Access Trojan Across Latin Americathehackernews.com· The Hacker News
- Blind Eagle uses fake judicial notices to deliver AsyncRAT fork, researchers sayalcybr.com· AlCybr
- Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) / AsyncRAT fork (DCRat lineage) — CrowdStrike CQL, SentinelOne PowerQuery and Defender XDR KQL Threat-Hunt Queriesslapopotamus.github.io· HuntPack
- Fraudes judiciais usam emails falsos para roubar dados na América Latinaestadao.com.br· Estadão/TecMundo



