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Blind Eagle Phishing Targets Colombia With RAT

ZenoX reconstructed a phishing wave with judicial lures, SVG/XHTML chaining, JavaScript, VBS, and a RAT, with no confirmed victims.

Whalemate Labs · AI-assisted researchPublished:40 min read

ZenoX reconstructed a regional phishing campaign observed between October 21 and November 1, 2026, using judicial and administrative lures in Spanish and Portuguese, with a clear focus on Colombia. The analysis was based on 12 fraudulent emails detonated and examined in separate virtual machines over about seven days. The technical chain started with a large XHTML file that was actually a disguised SVG and displayed a fake query tied to Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. From there, the flow used HTML smuggling to generate a locally built ZIP protected with ZipCrypto, a JavaScript dropper posing as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298, a VBS stage with AMSI and ETW bypasses, and finally PowerShell to decrypt and load a x64 RAT into memory.

ZenoX's report, and coverage derived from The Hacker News, agree that there is no evidence of a real victim organization being compromised. The report itself says the visible corpus was small and does not allow the full scope or the sector or country distribution to be extrapolated. The Hacker News reported, citing ZenoX, that there were nearly 3,300 malicious emails during the period, but also noted that not all of them were aimed at Colombia and that successful operations against real targets could not be confirmed. AlCybr and HuntPack add important context: the first recalls Blind Eagle, or APT-C-36, has a regional history in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Panama, while the second warns that attribution and shared infrastructure should not be confused with independent confirmation of the wave under analysis.

On the technical side, the chain left artifacts and hunting patterns that are useful for defenders, including persistent files %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_.xhtml, copies under C:\Users\Public, Startup shortcuts based on SvcConfig.vbs, the presentation name Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298, and the ZIP pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip. ZenoX also published observed distribution and command infrastructure, with clear limits: crp2026[.]online behind Cloudflare, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com tied to 45[.]146[.]81[.]142, and ports 4782, 5357, and 5985. The report does not provide full hashes, YARA or Sigma rules, or the complete C2 configuration, so the strongest reading is that this was a highly polished phishing operation, technically consistent, but with no verified real-world compromise in the available material.

Executive summary

ZenoX reconstructed a regional phishing wave with judicial and administrative lures, observed between late October and early November 2026, from 12 fraudulent emails analyzed in a lab. The technical chain combined a disguised SVG/XHTML file, HTML smuggling, a ZipCrypto-protected ZIP, JavaScript, VBS, and PowerShell to end with a x64 RAT loaded into memory. The visible material points clearly to Colombia in the initial lure, while the rest of the campaign uses Spanish and Portuguese and touches justice, public administration, and education sectors, with no proof of confirmed real victims.

The most relevant initial artifact was a file named 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml, about 4.2 MB in size, which actually worked as an SVG built to render a fake consultation page from Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. That page did not download the archive directly. Instead, it generated a ZIP locally with ZipCrypto and displayed the password on screen. The observed name followed the pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip, a way to evade mail gateway inspection and move execution into the victim's browser or host.

Inside the ZIP was a JavaScript dropper presented as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298. That script collected system and environment information, including OS version, network profile, install date, memory, computer name, environment variables, and directories localized in Portuguese and Spanish. It then chained additional stages, including a VBS file that bypassed AMSI and ETW, showed a decoy page titled CITACION PENAL, FISCALIA, deleted the original XHTML, and manipulated Zone.Identifier to remove Mark of the Web. Persistence was reconstructed through an XHTML file under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, an auxiliary copy in C:\Users\Public\, and a Startup shortcut based on SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs.

The final stage was handled by PowerShell, which decoded the payload using AES-256-ECB, a custom Base85 scheme, and GZIP, then loaded it into memory through Reflection and delegates. ZenoX classified the binary as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage, while lab analysis describes it as a native x64 PE64, classified as a DLL, written in VB.NET on .NET Framework 4.8, with obfuscation, virtualization, and altered names. Observed behaviors include a hidden desktop with CreateDesktopW, keylogging, screen capture, streaming, token impersonation, and input blocking. In parallel, the report published observed infrastructure, with limits: crp2026[.]online behind Cloudflare, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com as the C2, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 with ports 4782, 5357, and 5985. There is no evidence in the material of successful compromise in real organizations, and the report itself warns that the corpus is small and does not allow total scope or victim distribution by country or sector to be measured precisely.

Context and background

The investigation relied on a limited set of 12 initial fraudulent emails, collected and detonated in separate virtual machines over about seven days. The visible dates help place the timeline, but they do not prove when the code was written or whether infrastructure had been compromised earlier. One of the consultation pages analyzed shows a generation date of October 21, 2026. Another shows October 27, 2026, while captured headers record messages from October 27 and 30. The capture names indicate collection on November 1, 2026.

Coverage derived from The Hacker News placed the wave at nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026. That figure broadens the reference frame, but it does not change a central limitation in the case, no successful attack against real targets could be confirmed. AlCybr reinforced that point by noting that ZenoX analyzed 12 messages in controlled environments and did not report evidence of a real organization being compromised. HuntPack, for its part, stressed that this set should not be mixed with background sources on earlier Blind Eagle campaigns.

The lures were written in Spanish and Portuguese and simulated judicial notices, prosecutor alerts, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents. The visible corpus included recipients associated with justice, public administration, and education, as well as contacts tied to public organizations. The report makes clear that the set is small and does not allow proportions by sector to be extrapolated. The explicit judicial focus identified points to Colombia, through the impersonation of a Colombian judicial body and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, but the report does not provide a complete list of affected countries or a victim count by jurisdiction.

ZenoX also proposed a Brazilian operator hypothesis based on hosting in Cotia, Brazilian ASN 265919, the America/Sao_Paulo time zone, code references in Portuguese, and Portuguese lures. That reading is presented as a hypothesis, not as confirmation. The report itself acknowledges that language and regional context alone do not prove the operator's physical location. In the same vein, The Hacker News presents the attribution to Blind Eagle, also known as APT-C-36, as ZenoX's assessment, not as independent corroboration. AlCybr adds that the use of Portuguese lures does not by itself prove the actor expanded into Brazil, although it does widen the region's potential exposure.

Timeline2026-10-21Generateddate2026-10-27Another pagevisible2026-11-01Screenshotscollected2026-11-04Posted by ZenoX2026-11-11HuntingPublic
Campaign timeline — Visible dates in the chain, collection, and technical publication.

Key facts table

Date Fact Source Confidence
2026-10-21 A consultation page linked to the chain showed a generation date of October 21, 2026. ZenoX confirmed
2026-10-27 Another consultation page showed a generation date of October 27, 2026, and captured headers recorded messages from October 27 and 30. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-01 The captures analyzed by ZenoX were collected on this date. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-04 ZenoX published the analysis of the campaign and its reconstruction from 12 fraudulent emails. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-04 The file 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml was actually a disguised SVG impersonating Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-04 The chain created persistence through %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, a copy in C:\Users\Public\, and SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs in Startup. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-04 The final payload was classified as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-04 ZenoX published crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com as observed infrastructure. ZenoX confirmed
2026-11-10 The Hacker News reported, citing ZenoX, nearly 3,300 malicious emails in the wave. The Hacker News attributed_by_source_as_uncertain
2026-11-11 HuntPack published MITRE ATT&CK mapping and hunting patterns for the chain. HuntPack confirmed

Operation timeline

Date Event Actor/vector Verified source
2026-10-21 The fake consultation page already showed a visible generation date in the lure. SVG/XHTML consultation page ZenoX
2026-10-27 Another page linked to the campaign showed a generation date, and email headers from October 27 and 30 were captured. Email and web lure ZenoX
2026-11-01 The captures analyzed by ZenoX were collected on this day. Analysis lab ZenoX
2026-11-04 ZenoX published its report on the phishing wave. ZenoX ZenoX
2026-11-10 Derivative coverage from The Hacker News included the nearly 3,300-email figure. The Hacker News The Hacker News
2026-11-11 HuntPack published hunting queries and associated TTPs. Threat hunting repository HuntPack

Attack chain and TTPs

The observed chain is modular and depends on several evasion layers before it reaches the final RAT. The entry point was an email with a judicial or administrative lure, in Spanish or Portuguese, that delivered an XHTML file styled like a formal document. That file was not a simple document, but a disguised SVG designed to render a fake consultation page from Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación. From there, the flow built a ZIP locally with ZipCrypto, shifting inspection to the victim's browser or system.

The next step was a JavaScript dropper that posed as Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298. That script performed host and environment reconnaissance, querying system data, network profile, install date, memory, computer name, environment variables, and paths localized in Portuguese and Spanish. It then chained additional stages, including a VBS file that bypassed AMSI and ETW, displayed a fake criminal citation page, and cleaned traces from the original XHTML. It also manipulated Zone.Identifier to remove Mark of the Web.

Persistence was reconstructed from three elements: the hidden XHTML file at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml, an auxiliary copy in C:\Users\Public\, and a shortcut in the Startup folder based on SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs. That combination suggests a simple but effective strategy to survive reboots and maintain the appearance of system-related activity. The final stage, executed by PowerShell, decoded the payload with AES-256-ECB, custom Base85, and GZIP, then loaded it into memory using Reflection and delegates.

ZenoX described the final binary as a fork of AsyncRAT with DCRat lineage. Lab analysis placed it as a native x64 PE64, classified as a DLL, written in VB.NET on .NET Framework 4.8, with obfuscation and virtualization. The documented behavior includes a hidden desktop, keylogging, screen capture, streaming, token impersonation, and input blocking. The report also cites internal strings such as Boss/Client77, Client77, Client.Settings, CryptoCore, Aes256, MutexControl, Packet, MsgPack, MsgPackEntry, ProcessCritical, and IdSender, which are useful for enrichment but are not exclusive to this variant.

Attack flowEmail withjudicial lurefake XHTMLand weaponized SVGZIP withZipCryptoJavaScript andevasive VBSPowerShell and RATloaded into memory
Technical infection flow — Brief sequence from the HTML lure to the RAT in memory.
MITRE ATT&CK TTP Description Source
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment with judicial and administrative lures. HuntPack
T1204.002 User execution of a malicious file. HuntPack
T1027.006 HTML Smuggling to build the ZIP in the browser. HuntPack
T1036 Masquerading of XHTML, JavaScript, and VBS. HuntPack
T1027 Use of compressed files and obfuscation. HuntPack
T1059.007 JavaScript execution. HuntPack
T1059.005 Visual Basic Script execution. HuntPack
T1059.001 PowerShell use for decryption and in-memory loading. HuntPack
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer for later stages. HuntPack
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. HuntPack
T1070.004 File deletion of the original XHTML. HuntPack
T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web bypass through Zone.Identifier manipulation. HuntPack
T1547.001 Startup Folder for persistence. HuntPack
T1562.001 Impair Defenses, including AMSI and ETW bypass. HuntPack
T1620 Reflective Code Loading of the final payload. HuntPack
T1056.001 Keylogging. HuntPack
T1113 Screen Capture. HuntPack
T1125 Video Capture. HuntPack
T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft. HuntPack
T1005 Data from Local System. HuntPack
T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography. HuntPack
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. HuntPack
T1082 System Information Discovery. HuntPack
T1012 Query Registry. HuntPack
T1083 File and Directory Discovery. HuntPack

Regional impact

The campaign shows a broad regional surface, but the material does not allow confirmed real victims to be claimed or impact to be distributed by country with precision. What is clear is the use of bilingual lures aimed at justice, prosecutors' offices, public administration, and education, with a visible focus on Colombia and a hypothesis of Brazilian operational context, always presented as an inference rather than a closed attribution. ZenoX spoke of nearly 3,300 emails in the wave, while the corpus actually analyzed was 12 messages.

Regional coverageVerifiable facts in the materialColombiaExplicit facts in lure and chainBrazilOperational hypothesis, not confirmationArgentinaNo additional factsChileNo additional factsPeru, Mexico, USANo additional facts
Visible regional coverage — Countries with verifiable facts and countries with no additional evidence in the research.

Regional overview

The regional pattern combines institutional language, judicial topics, and administrative vectors to reach high-value profiles in Latin America. The mix of Spanish and Portuguese increases the chance of interaction across several countries, but the only country explicitly identified in the lures and documents is Colombia. The rest of the regional reading rests on visible victimology and associated infrastructure, not on confirmed compromises.

Colombia

Colombia is the only country explicitly identified in the main technical lure, because of the impersonation of a Colombian judicial body and the Fiscalía General de la Nación. The initial file 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml and the fake judicial query point to that jurisdiction, while another message simulates a tutela proceeding and an urgent circular linked to public procurement. Even so, ZenoX makes clear there is no evidence of a confirmed Colombian victim or a real compromise in an operational environment.

Brazil

Brazil appears in the operator attribution hypothesis because of hosting in Cotia, Brazilian ASN 265919, the America/Sao_Paulo time zone, and code references in Portuguese. The Hacker News presents that reading as ZenoX's assessment, not as independent confirmation. Brazilian coverage from Estadão/TecMundo repeats the nearly 3,300-email figure, but it also does not establish confirmed compromises in Brazilian organizations.

Argentina

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material to assign confirmed impact to Argentina. The campaign's regional language could widen potential exposure, but the research offers no victims, domains, or lures specifically attributed to that country.

Chile

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Chile. AlCybr recalls that Blind Eagle has a regional history in several Latin American countries, including Chile, but that background reference does not belong to this infection chain and should not be mixed with it.

Paraguay

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Paraguay. The analyzed corpus does not allow victims or country-specific lures to be identified for that jurisdiction.

Bolivia

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Bolivia. The available evidence is limited to the general chain and observed infrastructure, without country-level breakdown.

Peru

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Peru. The report does not include indicators or cases tied specifically to that country.

Mexico

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for Mexico. The campaign could matter to agencies and companies across the region, but ZenoX does not break down confirmed destinations by country in the analyzed set.

United States

There are no additional verifiable facts in the material for the United States. Shared Cloudflare infrastructure should not be read as geographic origin, and the research offers no territory-specific link to that country.

Technical indicators

Type Value Source
Domain crp2026[.]online ZenoX, HuntPack
IP 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 ZenoX, HuntPack
IP 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 ZenoX, HuntPack
C2 hostname vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com ZenoX, HuntPack
IP associated with C2 45[.]146[.]81[.]142 ZenoX, HuntPack
Port 4782 ZenoX, HuntPack
Port 5357 ZenoX, HuntPack
Port 5985 ZenoX, HuntPack
File 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml ZenoX
File Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298 ZenoX, The Hacker News
File Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip ZenoX
File %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_ZNn4r6.xhtml ZenoX
File C:\Users\Public\ ZenoX
File SvcConfigZNn4r6.vbs ZenoX
File client77_rat.bin ZenoX

The hash prefixes published by ZenoX, efa891[...], 43bf[...], and 3bfb[...], were truncated in the public version of the report. HuntPack notes that IPs 104[.]21[.]16[.]229 and 172[.]67[.]216[.]190 are shared Cloudflare addresses and should not be treated as the operator's origin. It also recommends using only crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142, along with the observed ports on the C2 node, as actionable indicators.

Analysis for security teams

The operational priority is to detect the full chain, not just a domain or IP. The initial vector is built so the email looks like a formal justice or public administration communication, with themes such as judicial process, tutela, prosecutor notices, or procurement. The most useful preventive control point is the combination of large HTML or XHTML attachments, file names in expediente format, and a ZIP that is generated locally and only resolved in the browser.

In email, the useful correlation combines language, format, and delivery. The name 43262 CONSTANCIA-Despacho.COL.97-126.xhtml, together with the pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip, offers a reasonable filter for hunting and triage. It is also worth reviewing messages with formal references to case files, judicial notices, or tutela proceedings, especially when the communication pushes the user toward immediate opening.

On the endpoint side, the sequence leaves more stable traces than the C2. The patterns SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml, and copies under C:\Users\Public\ provide better value for retrospective hunting than an IP behind Cloudflare. Also useful are signs of XHTML deletion, Zone.Identifier manipulation, VBS in Startup, and anomalous PowerShell execution with decoding before code reflection.

The execution-defense side deserves specific attention. AMSI and ETW bypasses, Reflection, delegates, and in-memory loading of a VB.NET binary on .NET Framework 4.8 indicate a chain designed to reduce visibility. In that context, behavior-based detection is more effective than hash-only detection. HuntPack's MITRE ATT&CK mapping can be used to refine queries in SIEM or EDR tools, especially for T1059.001, T1620, T1547.001, T1562.001, T1056.001, and T1134.001.

For prioritization, the combination of crp2026[.]online and vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com is stronger than the parent domain myvnc[.]com or the Cloudflare IPs. HuntPack makes that clear, and the warning matters to avoid noise. If the C2 or the persistence artifact is found, the case should be treated as a probable compromise or a very advanced attempt, but the available material does not allow successful exploitation in the region to be asserted.

MITRE ATT&CK MapInitial AccessT1566.001, T1204.002, T1027.006Defense EvasionT1036, T1027, T1562.001, T1553.005ExecutionT1059.007, T1059.005, T1059.001, T1620PersistenceT1070.004, T1547.001Impact and TheftT1056.001, T1113, T1125, T1134.001, T1005, T1573.001, T1041, T1082, T1012, T1083

MITRE ATT&CK Map — Techniques observed and described by HuntPack for this chain.

Frequently asked questions

What part of the chain is best supported, and what remains hypothetical?

The best-supported part is the technical chain observed in the lab, from the fake XHTML to in-memory RAT loading. The least solid hypothesis is the operator's geographic attribution to Brazil, because it rests on infrastructure, time zone, and language without independent confirmation. See also the sections "Attack chain and TTPs" and "Regional impact."

Are there confirmed victims in Colombia or Brazil?

No. ZenoX said it could not confirm successful attacks against real targets, and AlCybr notes the analysis was done on 12 emails in controlled virtual machines. Colombia appears in the main lure, but not as a confirmed victim. Brazil appears as a possible operational context, not a proven destination. See "Executive summary" and "Regional impact."

Which IOCs are worth using for hunting, and which are not?

The most actionable indicators are crp2026[.]online, vpfinal142[.]myvnc[.]com, and 45[.]146[.]81[.]142, with ports 4782, 5357, and 5985 observed on the C2. HuntPack clarifies that myvnc[.]com alone is not a specific IOC, and that the Cloudflare IPs should not be treated as the operator's origin. See "Technical indicators."

What local artifacts should be searched for on endpoints?

HuntPack recommends checking SvcConfig<suffix>.vbs, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\index_<suffix>.xhtml, copies in C:\Users\Public\, the presentation name Network Configuration Auditor v2.7.298, and the ZIP pattern Demanda_Ejecutiva_*__EXP2026-XXXX.zip. If PowerShell execution with prior decoding also appears, the case rises in priority. See "Technical indicators" and "Analysis for security teams."

Which MITRE ATT&CK techniques best summarize this campaign?

The most representative techniques are spearphishing attachment, HTML smuggling, JavaScript, VBS, PowerShell, defense evasion, Startup Folder, reflective code loading, keylogging, screen capture, and token impersonation. HuntPack published a broad mapping that also includes file deletion, deobfuscation, data from local system, and exfiltration over C2 channel. See "Attack chain and TTPs."

Material limitations

The main limitation is the lack of independent confirmation of successful attacks. ZenoX worked with 12 emails and a controlled lab, while the nearly 3,300-message figure comes from derivative coverage and does not change that limitation. The material does not allow a real compromise to be asserted for an organization in Colombia, Brazil, or any other country.

Full hashes, YARA or Sigma rules, complete C2 configuration, full host or mutex values, and exact registry key paths were also not published. The hash prefixes appear truncated, and the infrastructure IOCs must be interpreted carefully because of Cloudflare and the myvnc host range. Attribution to Blind Eagle or APT-C-36, and the hypothesis of a Brazilian operational cluster, remain source assessments rather than independent verification.

Sources

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