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Qubole AWS Credentials Exposed

A suspected supply chain attack on Qubole may have exposed AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials, according to cited analysis.

Whalemate Labs · AI-assisted researchPublished:2 min read

A technical analysis attributed to Wiz described suspicious activity in the AWS account used by Qubole, with sts:AssumeRole calls between Oct. 14 and 26. According to that material, the attacker sought secrets in Lambda, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, and collected AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID secrets and Okta credentials.

A suspected supply chain attack on Qubole may have let an unidentified actor abuse an AWS account tied to the platform to access customer secrets, according to technical analysis attributed to Wiz, with input from Sentra and Mandiant. The cited material places the suspicious activity between Oct. 14 and Oct. 26 and says the target was AWS, Microsoft Entra ID and Okta credentials.

What did the attacker do?

The hunting analysis attributed to Wiz says the activity relied on credentials linked to the AWS account used by Qubole, from which sts:AssumeRole was invoked. According to that material, the attacker searched for secrets in Lambda, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, and appears to have gathered sensitive material stored in those services.

That collected material, again according to the cited analysis, would have included AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID customer secrets and Okta credentials. The investigation is presented as technical hunting work, not as a final public attribution, so the sequence should be read as alleged, not confirmed publicly.

What did AWS say, according to secondary sources?

A secondary source attributed to AWS the clarification that its services were not compromised and that they operated as designed. In the same vein, the recommendation was to review IAM roles across accounts, remove obsolete integrations, apply least privilege and restrict trust policies by IP where appropriate.

That approach shifts attention to trusted cross-account integrations and to how a poorly managed IAM relationship can become an access vector. Based on the available sources, the case does not point to a failure in AWS cloud services themselves, but to abuse of permissions and secrets tied to third-party integrations.

What was the scope of the incident?

SecurityWeek reported that more than a dozen organizations were affected by the incident linked to Qubole. The available material does not confirm any specific impact on companies in Latin America, so there is no evidence in these sources to identify regional victims or extend the geographic scope beyond that global figure.

The reference to multiple affected organizations reinforces the picture of a supply chain incident with downstream effects, meaning on customers or integrations that trusted the platform. In the facts verified by the research, the critical point was the exposure of credentials through a shared or delegated AWS role, not an announced intrusion against each customer separately.

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